ALTERNATIVE LANDINGS ......

Acknowledgements:  Thomas P. Turner (Mastery Flight Training, Inc. & Flight Instructor Hall of Fame inductee)

“Freeway motorists captured video of the last seconds of a Piper’s landing on a highway, when the engine quit during an instructional flight near San Diego. The instructor, who reportedly took over the controls “when it was obvious the airplane was not going to make it” to Gillespie Field airport, did a great job of avoiding vehicles, overhead power lines and other obstacles. Motorists were helpful in getting out of the way as well.

As such cases often do, this event caused widespread internet discussion of whether or not to land on a road in the event of single-engine engine failure, or if other options are safer. I submit that, unlike in rural areas with open fields, in the case of major metropolitan areas highways may indeed be the best option.

We talk about the added risk of flight over mountains, over water, and sometimes even over large forests. That discussion almost never includes the quite similar additional hazard of flight over densely populated areas .... If your engine quit over this terrain where would you go? Do you include the lack of emergency landing sites in your risk management decision?

Considerthe area near where the Piper went down. There are more emergency landing areas near KSEE than there are in a forest, but only if you consider the highways — far from optimal, but in this case the only real options.

Do you think about the lack of landing sites when planning a flight over densely populated areas? How different is the risk flying over San Diego, or Los Angeles, Chicago or New York, or even over Kansas City or Wichita, than it is flying over the great forests of the Northeast or the upper Midwest?

Just as flight over mountains, open water, or dense forests should prompt consideration of the few emergency landing sites, and perhaps re-routing if possible to remain within gliding range of those few sites available, so too should you think about the lack of options when flying over densely populated areas, and select an altitude and route that keeps you within gliding range of emergency landing options whenever possible.

My point? There is rarely one correct response to an incomplete set of facts. Most of the time I’d say landing on a busy road is not the best option. But seeing the lack of alternatives as the instructor and student would have seen them, I laud them for skilfully carrying out what was probably the only option available to them when the engine quit (whether or not they could have detected engine issues sooner or prevented it altogether will have to wait for the NTSB investigation).

This reinforces how important it is for you to get as much information as possible, and continually evaluate your options before you need to implement your decisions. VFR or IFR, long cross-country or trip around the pattern, take the hazards into account before you decide what’s right for you on that particular flight.

Then, practice similar scenarios. If you ever see a situation where you might have to land on a road, remain current on making short-field obstacle approaches and landings (do so even if you don’t think you’ll ever have to land on a road). 

Hazard management and risk tolerance are very personal things. Whatever you choose to accept, do so because you have the skills and knowledge to do so safely and within the bounds of regulation. Don’t choose to do something very risky out of impatience, or because you failed to evaluate the big picture … or just because someone else on-line said it was a good idea!

Finally, some Pithy Words for Pilots sent (some time ago) by reader Chris Larson:

• Airspeed, altitude, and awareness. Got to have at least two out of three!
• Slow & low's a no-no. (re: approaches/final glide)
• When all else fails, feet pick up the wings. (re: stalls/spins)
• Altitude = options.
• Only birds land butt-first!
• What goes up must come down. Where and how is flexible... unless you procrastinate!
• Believe the problem first. Ask why later.
• If it's bothering you, fix it before flying it.
• No one regrets keeping up to scratch”.

FLY SAFE!

THE BAD NEWS AND GOOD NEWS ABOUT ENGINE FAILURES

Acknowledgements: AIR FACTS (John Zimmerman)

(Ed. Note: The following is condensed from an article by John, which can be read in full on the Sporty’s AIR FACTS site. Thankyou John!)

“You’ve probably said it to a nervous passenger: “Don’t worry, airplane engines almost never quit” .... This is mostly true for turbine engines, but it’s far less true for piston engines.

THE BAD NEWS

According to the NTSB and FAA, there are somewhere between 150 and 200 accidents per year that are caused by power loss. Roughly a quarter of these are fatal, which makes this the second leading cause of fatal accidents. Such events seem to be holding steady, even though overall accidents have declined somewhat in recent years. Data from AOPA paints a similar picture. An interesting study from the Australian Transportation Safety Board (which does some first-rate safety research), offers more supporting evidence: There were 322 engine failures or malfunctions between 2009 and 2014. 

It’s worth pointing out that all these statistics almost certainly under-count the actual number of engine failures, since they only appear in these reports the result is an accident. 

THE GOOD NEWS

The good news is that “System Malfunction (Powerplant)” hides an awful lot of important details. That NTSB phrase merely defines the event, not the root cause. And by far the most common reason piston engines quit is because they don’t receive fuel, either due to fuel starvation (the airplane has fuel but it doesn’t make it to the engine) or fuel exhaustion (the airplane truly ran out of it). These two causes account for over one-third of engine failure accidents, but they are completely under the control of the pilot.

Pilots will probably always find ways to run out of fuel, but it bears repeating that a few good habits can dramatically reduce your chances of such an engine failure. 

·      Having a hard one-hour minimum is a great place to start – under no circumstances can you still be flying with less than one hour of fuel in the tanks. 

·      Next, spend some time understanding the fuel system so you can always get that fuel to the engine, especially in twins and older airplanes with complicated fuel systems. 

·      Take a little time away from practicing a rare emergency and instead discuss different fuel scenarios that might pop up. 

·      Finally, always know how much fuel was in the tanks at engine start and know your real-world fuel burn rate. Depending on those, and not as much on the gauges, will lead to more realistic decision-making.

THE ENGINE QUIT. BUT WHY?

The list of causes includes:

·      Pilot mistakes, generally preventable

·      Fuel contamination. It does happen and it can have serious consequences. Again, this is almost totally preventable, by performing a thorough pre-flight every time and staying with the airplane whenever it’s fuelled to verify you get the right type.

·      Next comes carburettor icing, which is either impossible (fuel injected engines) or preventable (by using the carb heat). The penalty for pulling that knob is fairly small in most airplanes, so when in doubt you should use it – even if the conditions seem inhospitable for icing. A carburettor temperature gauge is a good idea too, especially for some Continental models.

·      By the time you get to real mechanical failures such as a failed magneto or a broken connecting rod, the numbers are fairly small – less than 20% of all powerplant problems. Some of these are simply bad luck, but a decent number were due to faulty maintenance, typically soon after major repair work or overhaul. This argues for high quality maintenance, but it also supports Mike Busch’s theory of Reliability Centred Maintenance, where overhauls are completed on-condition, not based on an arbitrary time limit.

THE RIGHT HABITS

First, the easy stuff: Develop good habits regarding fuel management and maintain the discipline to follow them every time: 

·      Sample fuel before every flight

·      Buy from reputable FBOs 

·      Make sure your fuel caps seal tightly

·      Use carb heat (if applicable) on every flight to prevent icing, not just when the engine starts to run rough.

Beyond those everyday basics: 

·      Seek out high quality maintenance, but perhaps only when it’s really needed. The right balance will keep the engine under close supervision, with regular oil analysis and borescopes, but avoid added risk from doing invasive part replacement too often. 

·      When maintenance is performed, pilots should be sceptical on the first flight after overhaul or parts replacement. In other words, don’t make that first trip a hard IFR trip over the mountains.

Of course some traditional advice also helps a lot: 

·      Fly the airplane regularly

·      Avoid cold starts 

·      Operate the engine conservatively (especially with respect to CHT) 

The biggest payoff from these habits is in longevity, especially when it comes to preventing corrosion, but there is certainly some improvement in reliability to be had as well.

Following these rules can reduce your chances of an engine failure by over 75%, which should make you feel a lot more comfortable on your next flight over remote terrain. But that still means the fan out front can stop turning. In that situation, all you have to fall back on is good training and realistic planning. 

Based on the numbers above, practising engine failure scenarios as a part of your regular training is time well spent, and continuously thinking about forced landing sites in flight doesn’t hurt either. 

Engines can and do fail, but a little preparation and a little paranoia should keep you from adding to those statistics”.

FLY SAFE!

WILFUL NON-COMPLIANCE

Acknowledgements: Thomas P. Turner, Mastery Flight Training, Inc.

(Ed. Note: A condensed version of an article by Tom outlining how we can learn from those who didn't ...)

Case 1:

A Falcon 50business jet ran off the end of Runway 19 at Greenville, South Carolina. The ATP-certificated occupant of the left seat and the PPL Pilot seated in the right were killed. Two passengers suffered “serious” injuries and the aircraft broke apart.

....the airplane touched down "normally" at a normal touchdown point on runway .... the sole thrust reverser on the centre engine deployed .... the airplane "did not decelerate" as it continued down the runway....  and then went over an embankment ....  all three engines were operating at full power for at least 20 minutes after the accident with one engine running on until about 40 minutes after .... both airbrakes were extended .... both main landing gear were fractured and displaced aft into the flaps .... the braking anti-skid switch was in the No. 1 position, and there was an "INOP" placard next to the switch .... the Nos. 2 and 3 fire handles were pulled .... the parking brake was in the off position .... 

.... the left-seat pilot held an ATP certificate with a type rating for the Falcon 50 but with a limitation for second-in-command only. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate .... he reported 11,650 total hours of flight experience .... the right seat pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for single and multi-engine airplanes .... he did not hold an instrument rating .... he held a FAA second-class medical certificate .... he reported 5,500 total hours of flight experience.

We don’t know if the pilots’ lack of qualification for operating the big tri-jet was a causal factor in the crash .... it’s easy to say, “these pilots were intentionally noncompliant with the regulations” .... anyone who believes in the need for any safety oversight of aviation at all should agree these pilots did not meet the minimum standard prescribed for the operation, assuming the NTSB preliminary information is correct. 

Case 2:

Three skydivers and the pilot of a Cessna 182 died, and a fourth jumper was seriously injured, when it collided with terrain shortly after taking off ....  a witness reported that while the pilot was refuelling the airplane, he realised that the right wing fuel cap was missing .... a mechanic and the pilot decided to use "fuel cell tape" over the fuel filler port .... the flight then departed with a group of skydivers ..... the jump airplane returned, and the final group of skydivers boarded for departure .... the airplane taxied for take-off .... shortly after that a police car headed towards the end of runway 14 .... and a witness saw a huge fire at the end of the runway .... Cessna 182s have vented fuel caps. Air must be able to enter the tank through the fuel cap vent to permit fuel to be drawn from that tank. A blocked or missing vent may prevent fuel from flowing from that tank to the engine.

It’s unknown what may have led to the apparent departure stall of the skydiving Cessna 182, or if the unauthorised tape-over of the open fuel filler port in lieu of a proper fuel cap was involved in any way ....it’s probably easy to agree that the pilot was wilfully non-compliant with aircraft maintenance and certification standards by taking off with fuel cell tape in place of a missing fuel cap .... some, however, might feel there may be some justification for this unapproved modification .... the pilot may be unaware of the need for vented fuel caps in some airplanes, or of how vital those vents are to fuel system and engine operation .... the fuel system should work fine using the other tank, they might think .... the line between wilful noncompliance and acceptable modification may become a little fuzzy to some.

Case 3:

The pilot of a Cirrus SR22T was hand-propping the aircraft .... when the engine started, the power apparently set fairly high, the unsecured airplane quickly began to move forward .... As the pilot is seen attempting to enter the aircraft to regain control, a passenger who was aboard is seen rolling off the airplane’s right wing, leaving the cabin apparently unoccupied .... the Cirrus accelerated into a hangar, causing substantial damage .... no significant injuries, although the pilot reportedly went to the hospital because of an injury to his arm .... a witness statementnotes the pilot called a mechanic asking for a battery charge, as the airplane’s battery “did not have enough energy to turn over the prop” .... the mechanic told the pilot no mechanic would be at the airport “until Monday” .... six minutes later the pilot called the mechanic again, telling him the Cirrus had impacted a hangar .... the SR22TPOH contains a limitation that requires an operable battery be installed for flight .... arguably, a discharged battery is in violation of this limitation, but would you want to be the pilot having to make that argument? .... another witnesspilot with SR22 experience noticed fuel leaking and, entering the cabin, turned off the fuel, pulled the mixture to idle and turned off the electrical system, all of which were still “on” .... It’s possible that if the pilot of the SR22T had chocked his airplane while he “propped” the engine, and/or if he had trained his passenger to pull the mixture control at the first sign the airplane was moving forward, that the admittedly high-risk hand-start would have been successful …. only leaving the pilot with possible other electrical system and/or battery failure issues in flight!

I’ve heard some comment focusing not on the need to comply with type design and aircraft Limitations (requiring a delay until the battery may be recharged) but instead on the “correct” way to hand-prop an airplane .... when pilots hear this happened on a Saturday morning, and that charging it up couldn’t happen until Monday, some “go mentality” goal-oriented pilots would consider propping the airplane even if they had no prior experience doing so .... after all, why do we learn about how the magneto-powered ignition system works if we aren’t supposed to use this information to our advantage?

Case links:

In all threecases there is acommon thread: The pilots were intentionally choosing to violate regulations, rules or good operating practice.

So ask yourself: 

Where doYOU draw the line on wilful noncompliance with:

• Pilot certification, qualifications and currency 

What if a pilot is legally qualified, but not current for a given operation? IFR currency? Night currency with passengers? Current in multi-engine airplanes, but not in singles? 

• Airplane maintenance and airworthiness

Unapproved alterations? Inoperative fuel gauges or other required items, if you’ve developed a work-around?  The airplane is “a little” out of annual?

• Deviations from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or accepted practice

Are you willing to do things you wouldn’t normally do, if the usual way of doing things becomes inconvenient? 

Honestly answering that question every time you come upon the need to make a decision, then making an objective choice that avoids hazard and protects lives and equipment (in that order), is THE ESSENCE OF RISK MANAGEMENT. It is what it means to be IN COMMAND OF YOUR AIRCRAFT.

FLY SAFE!