LOOKING GOOD, BUT SEEING LITTLE.......

LOOKING GOOD BUT SEEING LITTLE.......

Acknowledgements: Rod Machado’s Aviation Learning Center (https://rodmachado.com)

(Ed.Note: The following is taken from an article available in full at Rod’s website, which is well worth a visit)

“I was having a difficult time seeing things that were in plain view. My problem began with placing a candy bar on the first shelf of the kitchen pantry. A few days later, I went in search of my candy bar. It had mysteriously migrated to a lower shelf. I never saw it. Despite looking at all three shelves, I simply couldn’t see what was clearly there to be seen on the middle shelf.

Fortunately, there’s nothing lethal about a candy bar that escapes notice. You can’t say the same if you fail to notice a crack in your propeller, nearby airborne traffic, or objects on the runway during landing. Now you understand my concern about the invisible candy bar! It turned out that my earthly vision was just fine, reading glasses assumed. My inability to find sweet treats stemmed from another cause.

We occasionally fail to notice things that should be noticeable, especially if we keep searching. This happens when our expectations collide with our experience. Who wouldn’t expect to see their candy bar where they last placed it? It’s as if, failing to see what we expected to see, our mind stops the search prematurely. 

Dr Jeremy Wolf, a Harvard ophthalmology professor, discovered that when we go in search of things without finding them because they lack prevalence, we become less likely to find them during future searches when they’re actually present. There’s a good reason for this: It turns out that you’re just plain lazy, but don’t take it personally! 

Our brains are pretty good at minimising our conscious workload when we fail to find what we’re looking for. If we don’t see it immediately, we tend to abandon our search quickly, or at least don’t continue searching with the same intensity. That makes a certain kind of sense, since there’s little value in looking persistently for something when it’s most likely not there - as long as it isn’t a potentially-fatal hazard! Besides, looking is hard work, requiring intense concentration to say nothing of eyeball strain.

This explains why airport baggage screeners can miss important items when X-raying luggage. TSA agents scan for weapons but seldom find them, which makes it less likely that they’ll notice one when it’s actually there. 

Do you see how this can work against you as a pilot, especially when taking off or landing? Let’s say you glance down the runway, looking for aircraft, cars or animals. Because you’ve found few if any intruders in the past, the prevalence error suggests that you’re less likely to actually see an interloper when it’s actually there. Sure, you might look, but you’re also likely to abandon your search a little too quickly.

What’s the antidote for the prevalence error? How about doing what police officers do when they’re in the roughest of neighbourhoods? Treat everybody as a suspect. That’s right. The only thing you can do is to be sufficiently suspicious in those areas where the prevalence error might expose you to greater risk. That means treating critical things like your propeller, airborne traffic near airports or even the runway environment with suspicion.

Take the runway example, for instance. Is someone near it? On it? Approaching it? What the heck are they doing there? Call it runway profiling, because as far as you’re concerned all runways are assumed to be guilty until proven innocent. After all, they appear with white stripes on a black outfit, and each is identified with numbers. Treating with suspicion those items or events that require careful observation is how you force yourself to not abandon the search too quickly.

Clearly, the less often we see something, the less likely we are to see it when it’s actually there. We’re built to give up our searches early when experience suggests that the targets aren’t likely to be present. We simply have more important things to do with our brains.

Ultimately, we must force ourselves to spend more time looking where it counts and when it counts. It’s a strategy that applies to not only runways, but to other critical areas associated with flight where a threat is not often present but can have serious consequences if it is there and not noticed. 

Now you understand why the TSA folks want to take a peek inside your shoes and shorts. That’s where the bombs are. So, I’m happy to let them have a look. Had I applied this high-risk/high-intensity strategy when searching for my candy bar, I might have found it quicker .........”

FLY SAFE!

A 1200 NM VFR WORKOUT....

Acknowledgements: AIR FACTS (Fernando Pacheco)

(Ed.Note: The following is taken from Fernando’s article, to provide a real-world example of how to approach a solo cross-country ....)

“After a few days of poor weather and unplanned maintenance, I finally took to the skies in our club’s Cessna 182 to visit my nephew and some friends in Tennessee. This was my longest solo cross country adventure which tested my endurance, weather knowledge, aircraft management, and ability to pre-plan and adjust to conditions.

Planning

A week ahead I pre-planned primary and alternate routes, the primary being the most direct route between Allentown (PA) and my final destination of Smyrna (TN). This took me over the high terrain of Pennsylvania and West Virginia. My alternate routes were east of the mountains, traveling south through Maryland and Virginia and then southwest at Roanoke (VA) over even higher elevations. The other alternate was west of the primary route into the Zanesville (OH) area and south through Kentucky and on to Tennessee. 

I began reviewing the various long range forecasts along the various routes of travel, which seemed to indicate my best route would be the west route through Ohio. Therefore, as the date came closer I became more detailed on this route for airports, fuel stops, obstacles, and “all information” I could get my hands on.

Departure from Allentown

The evening before, I created a flight plan on my iPad, filed it, performed a self-brief, and reviewed the weather discussions for the Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee , Virginia, and West  Virginia areas. Based on this review, I adjusted my planning back to the most direct routing through West Virginia.

The morning of departure, I reviewed the most current weather discussion and called Flight Service for a Standard Brief. All was a go, knowing there would be isolated and scattered thunderstorms popping up but no Convective SIGMETS. Yet!

Having already completed a thorough pre-flight of the aircraft, my tools  and myself, the only thing left to do was wait for the cloud cover to lift somewhat. As soon as it ascended enough to allow VFR departure I fired up  and obtained my VFR departure clearance.

As the clouds could still become an issue on my climb-out, I requested a climb in the pattern to increase my margins. Departure could not accommodate my request but this did not pose any undue concern as the clouds continued to open up, and I knew I would be able to manoeuvre around cloud coverage to maintain VFR. This was just the beginning of my many deviations to remain VFR around build-ups both outbound and on the return journey.

En-route

My Stratux-based ADS-B receiver was indispensable in identifying weather I needed to steer away from en-route, but always looking out the window I also constantly monitored changes in the build-ups, ensuring I continued to identify and update all the manoeuvring required to remain VFR (climbs, left and right course deviations, descents). 

Eventually, I noted that soon I would not be able to climb high enough around the build-ups, and decided to go below the ceilings. I knew this would be a trade-off between better visibility higher, and lower margins closer to the hills. With that said, I maintained a constant vigilance on visibility and terrain avoidance. Little did I realise that the flight to Smyrna was the warm-up. The main event was saved for the return flight.

Return

For my return, I again planned multiple routes and fuel stops, and went through the same pre-flight planning routine noted above. All the routes planned had multiple isolated showers forecast and I would need to contend with this activity; I therefore chose the most direct route for my northbound return home.

Based on the conditions, I selected and planned two alternate airfields when filing my flight plan. The planning paid off as the first fuel stop had a (storm)cell right over the field. I decided to continue as I had an hour of flight time to destination and was working with the indication that the cell would be 20 miles away by the time I arrived. In the meantime, I noted to myself that I would make the divert decision 20 miles from the field.

At 22 miles the field still appeared IFR. ATC informed me there appeared to be one low VFR departure, but I was not about to attempt a low approach into an unfamiliar airfield with hills in the area. I informed ATC I was diverting to my alternate: Powell.  I contacted Flight Service and informed them of the diversion and increased my arrival time by 20 minutes. During planning, I ensured enough fuel would be available to divert from destination and both alternates, and to continue to Lexington (KY) if needed, or even to return to Smyrna if those were unavailable.

I decided early on for two fuel stops each way to ensure I always had enough fuel to take a longer route than preferred based on conditions. The planning paid off, as build-ups and isolated/scattered showers and storms were along every route possible to get to Honesdale (PA), that afternoon. I repeatedly needed to navigate off course to maintain VFR. I was constantly observing, evaluating, deciding and executing deviations.

Summary

I utilised flight following on both flights and found it interesting that not only did I communicate with the expected Class Charlie and TRSA approaches; I was also handed off to Indianapolis Centre and Memphis Centre based on route and ATC coverage of the different areas. I was not expecting those centres to be involved and will have to see how I change my preparation in the future. I did keep an ear out to the handoffs other aircraft were receiving and anticipated those frequencies having them loaded in standby.

I had a great flight and constant vigilance was maintained throughout, helping me stay ahead of the aircraft and the weather. For example, during my leg north to Clarksburg (WV), there was a small area I identified ahead of me – about 20 miles off and about 10 miles wide according to ATC, who also pointed out that the intensity was undetermined. I deviated approximately 30 degrees to the left, always aware of the “outs” and as I drew closer and was parallel to the area of disturbance, I informed ATC that the area was very intense in what appeared to be valley fog and heavy rain. This area of precipitation threw off cloud layers, reducing the ceilings. However, I always ensured a heading toward clearer skies and airports as much as possible, and the topping off of fuel allowed this increased margin of safety.

When  asked later if I had felt uncomfortable or that at any point it was too much for me, the answer was simply no. I always had several “outs”. In communications with ATC, they were always looking out for me also. I was comfortable with my capabilities in the aircraft and know the aircraft’s performance. I planned deviations, changes in altitude and fuel requirements. All I had remaining was to execute for any given condition. I did not hesitate: I decided on a course of action and executed. I re-evaluated if needed. I performed a variant of the Plan, Do, Check, Act continuous improvement cycle. The 3P’s were employed: Perceive (a hazard), Process (evaluate the level of risk), Perform (mitigate or eliminate the risk). I used all the tools I had available to constantly make decisions and adjust for any changes in conditions.

I also took the opportunity to practice entering and programming the Garmin with more involved flight plans and practiced loading approaches utilising them to help me identify the airports quicker”.

FLY SAFE!

SCENARIO-BASED SURVIVAL

Acknowledgements: Thomas P. Turner (Mastery Flight Training, Inc./Flight Instructor Hall of Fame inductee)

(Ed. Note: Thomas uses another actual occurrence to illustrate the fact that in many aviation situations the same things can apply regardless of aircraft type)

“A report released by the U.S. Air Force points to pilot error as the primary cause of a Hercules crash that killed all nine servicemembers onboard ... According to the report, the pilots and crew failed to respond appropriately when one of the aircraft’s four engines lost power on the take-off roll.

In spite of the power loss, the aircraft was able to make it into the air. Almost immediately after take-off, the problem was identified, and the pilot made the decision to return to the airport. 

The investigation concluded that the aircraft was still flyable, but a series of procedural and aircraft handling failures, compounded by confusion and uncertainty in the cockpit, led the pilot to turn toward the inoperative engine at a low airspeed and higher-than-recommended bank angle. This was followed by a hard left rudder input "which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the aircraft’s departure from controlled flight.”

The reportlists several factors that contributed to the crash, including:

·       the crew’s failure to adequately prepare for emergencies 

·       failure to reject the take-off

·       improperly executed after take-off and engine shutdown checklists and procedures

·       failure of the maintenance crew to properly diagnose and repair the engine.

Often, a system failure or other emergency is only the set-up for an eventual crash. Discipline, adherence to procedures, and systems knowledge, backed up with emergency procedures and checklists, will determine the outcome when something goes terribly wrong.

We tend to think of inflight emergencies as isolated events; individual problems to be identified and solved. This is especially true for the vast majority of general aviation pilots who receive all their instruction in actual aircraft - where it is difficult and at times even impossible to accurately and/or safely present emergency scenarios, because doing so is just too risky in actual flight. Typical practice scenarios might be:

·      Lose an engine? 

·               Establish Best Glide or “blue line” speed, as appropriate, 

·              Identify where you will go, maybe glide or manoeuvre in that condition for a bit, then power up and recover. 

·      Electrical fire in flight? 

·              Run through the checklist (or “talk your way through the procedure”, because you don’t want to actually turn off electrical power), 

·              then call it good and move on to the next task. 

Instead, we need to think about each abnormal or emergency condition as the first item in a series of actions and decisions that end with the airplane safely on the ground. Instead of dealing with a simulated problem and then moving on to the next syllabus item, think about everything you’d need to do after noting the new status, through and including getting your passengers and yourself out of the airplane on the ground.

I’m working with an Instrument Instructor candidate who in flight today used a phrase I’ve repeated many times before: “What are you doing now? What happens next? What happens after that?” That line of questions is often used to prepare for upcoming actions while proceeding along an instrument approach or missed approach course. Mishap history shows, however, that we should apply the same thinking to teaching, practicing and actually flying abnormal and emergency procedures. 

For example, that electrical fire might proceed something like this:

• Electrical smoke or fire condition identified.
• Emergency procedure: turn off alternator/generator and battery
• Panel goes dark. Some flight instruments rendered inoperative. Autopilot, if engaged, turns off. Communication and navigation go away.
• Instantaneous transition from autopilot-coupled, GPS-guided flight to hand-flown, partial panel/lost comm. flight in a dark cockpit … while still dealing with electrical smoke or fire!
• Continue with the Electrical Fire checklist while hand-flying partial panel. Ventilate the cabin.
• Possible need to enter an Emergency Descent if the fire does not go out. Probable off-airport landing (possibly out of low clouds), or a lost-comm. arrival to a runway. 
• If the fire goes out, turn everything off (still hand-flying partial panel), then turn on essential items and ensure nothing you restore begins to smoke or burn again.
• Re-acquire situational awareness and communication. Select a suitable nearby airport. Acquire information and brief for approach and landing. Reduced-capability descent and approach (possibly in IMC). 
• What if the runway environment is not visible at minimums? Do you miss the approach? Do you continue anyway, making a landing (or controlled crash) on or somewhere near the runway? 
• After landing and coming to a stop, evacuate the aircraft.

I’m something of an old-school type where the current philosophy of Scenario-Based Training (SBT) is concerned. I wholeheartedly agree that instructors should incorporate realistic scenarios into training. Where I differ from the modern mainstream is that I think we need to hone task-based skills first, and then add scenarios to make it real.

Concert pianistslearn the basics, then apply that learning to advance situations. And the good ones keep practicing the basics throughout their entire career. Similarly, pilots need to do the same thing: master the basics, then apply them to specific situations. Done well, the pilot can then correlate what he/she has learned and practiced to an unusual situation that presents itself in flight. Every decade or so we find regulators unveiling the latest “back to basics” program …  because the basics are that important.

Where I don’t see it happening much is in scenario-based abnormal and emergency procedures training ... especially if we train exclusively in actual aircraft. We need to continue to practice and improve on our emergency skills preparedness.... When you practice emergencies or study emergency checklists, approach it like that instructor candidate: ask yourself not only what you’ll do now, but also what you’ll do next, and what you’ll do after that, all the way to exiting or evacuating the aircraft on the ground”.

FLY SAFE!

A CAUTIONARY TALE ....

Acknowledgements: AIR FACTS (David Yonker)

(Ed.Note: Learning from one’s own actual experiences and those of others is a fine adjunct to knowledge of the theory, and although the following might never happen to you in exactly the same way, something like it perhaps could ...... so thanks David!)

“It was a sweet autumn VFR day, 10 mph breeze. I had just finished my commercial ticket so I was current and feeling proficient. I was number 15 to land at Arapahoe, Colorado. I remember thinking the folks in the ATC tower were earning their pay-checks today and this was no time for any extra words or simple questions on the radio.

By the time it was my turn to land, I had the cadence of the tower figured out. He was talking 80 mph with gusts of 100+ mph, and he had his hands full. My commercial flight instructor once told me something that always stuck with me: “The tower provides separation on the ground not in the air”. I never really believed that completely until this day some 25 years ago.

While in the pattern, I noticed a break up in my radio transmission, but never thought much about it until I was safely on the ground. Every time the tower called my tail number, my radio would cut out, but the tower never commented so I assumed they were hearing me just fine. They never once asked for a radio check as the controller had little time to even suck in air. If there was a problem I could check it out later. I had no idea I was being walked on at the time – it just never entered my mind.

My tail numbers ended in 12TC, and I had no idea there was another plane in the pattern with the same TC in his call letters. On final, I understood I was cleared to land. I was checking my gauges, airspeed, fuel, and last-minute normal stuff.

.... As my eyes scanned back to my runway (17R), I saw a shadow of two planes flying together: one was a high wing (on the bottom) and the other was me – a low wing on top. We were between 250 and 350 feet off the ground.

....  I went to full power and called tower to abort the landing, without ever seeing the other plane, and banking to the right so I could see the plane below me. We were only 30 to 50 feet apart. Knowing he could not see me yet, I wanted to see him, and be ready for any reaction he may take.

Now the tower was at his peak speed and so was I. He did take the time to inform me that I could do whatever I needed to do to stay safe, but if I was comfortable doing a tight 360, he could move me to number two to land. Otherwise I was back to the end of the line .... 

I requested a right 360, 60-degree bank, and I was then number two to land at 400 feet off the ground with full power. As I completed my 360 and tried to bleed off airspeed, the airplane that was number one to land was just touching down. I was going to have to land a little long (again no problem) until number one missed the first and second taxiway exits. Tower informed me that I was still number two to land, but not cleared to land, as I approached the end of the runway 100 feet off the ground and dropping fast.

Tower informed number one he needed to make the next taxiway exit or I’d be forced to go around. I watched him slow to almost a complete stop before making the turn. I was just past the numbers, ready to go full power again as the Tower calls, “Tango Charlie cleared to land or go around your choice.” As I was already near ground effect, I chose to flare and land. Tower called back: “Can you make the next taxiway exit? Number two is on a very short final.”

“Affirmative” was the answer, and I was happy to be on the ground and to have his trust in my flying .... My instructor’s comment, and my commercial training paid off that day to make my story a non-event, just a fun story with an expected ending. But you could add a lot of “what if’s” to this or any other landing. I hope my story is helpful to someone, too”.

FLY SAFE!